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Why Familial Searches of Civilian DNA Databases 
Can and Should Survive Carpenter 
JASPER FORD-MONROE† 
Over the past few years, a powerful new forensic technique has emerged. By uploading DNA from 
a crime scene to a civilian DNA database, such as GEDmatch, investigators can discover the 
genetic relatives of the perpetrator and thereby track down the perpetrator himself. This 
procedure is known as forensic genetic genealogy searching (FGGS), and in under three years it 
has cracked numerous decades-old cases once thought to be unsolvable. 
Concerned about genetic privacy and discrimination, most legal commentators have thus far 
confronted FGGS with raised hackles. They either argue FGGS is a Fourth Amendment search 
under Carpenter, or that it escapes Carpenter but ought to be severely restricted or prohibited by 
statute. 
This Note attempts to show both that FGGS is not a Fourth Amendment search under Carpenter, 
and that public policy supports its use to the fullest practicable extent. On the doctrinal side, 
FGGS is distinguishable on every point from the location information at issue in Carpenter. On 
the practical side, FGGS is of immense forensic value, and the existence of sensible regulatory 
restrictions should serve to assuage popular fears. 
  
 
 † J.D. 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The Author would like to thank 
Professor Binyamin Blum and Oliver Hamilton, as well as the rest of the HLJ team. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Since the United States Supreme Court revised the third-party doctrine in 
its 2018 Carpenter v. United States1 decision, many commentators have 
speculated about whether the decision applies to other kinds of emerging 
technology.2 One such technology is the civilian DNA database. Such databases 
now boast millions of users who have submitted their DNA.3 
 Law enforcement in some states has recently begun to use one of these 
databases, GEDmatch, to conduct familial searches for unidentified offenders.4 
The technique of conducting familial searches through civilian databases has no 
universally agreed-upon name at present. This Note will use the Department of 
Justice’s term, “forensic genetic genealogical DNA analysis and searching,” or 
“FGGS.”5 
 Up until now, commentators have argued that FGGS can or should be 
analogized to the location data collection in Carpenter.6 For example, they have 
suggested the high volume of data inherent in a person’s DNA profile is 
analogous to the high volume of location data involved in Carpenter.7 They have 
also voiced concerns about the sensitive personal information available in DNA, 
such as a person’s propensity for genetic-based disease.8 
 However, DNA only reveals information about a person’s biological being 
at time of birth, and cannot shed any light on a person’s actions, associations, or 
how they have chosen to live their life more generally.9 By contrast, the location 
information at stake in Carpenter reveals a person’s day-to-day actions and 
 
 1. Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 2. See, e.g., Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter: Extending the Third-Party 
Doctrine Beyond CSLI: A Consideration of IoT and DNA, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (2019); Paul Ohm, The Many 
Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH 357 (2019). 
 3. Company Facts, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts (last 
visited July 31, 2021) (over 20 million people in network); About, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about 
(last visited July 31, 2021) (more than 12 million testing kits sold). 
 4. Robert Gearty, DNA, Genetic Genealogy Made 2018 the Year of the Cold Case: “Biggest Crime-
Fighting Breakthrough in Decades,” FOX NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/us/dna-genetic-
genealogy-made-2018-the-year-old-the-cold-case-biggest-crime-fighting-breakthrough-in-decades. 
            5.   U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INTERIM POLICY: FORENSIC GENETIC GENEALOGICAL DNA ANALYSIS AND 
SEARCHING 1 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1204386/download. 
 6. Compare George M. Dery III, Can a Distant Relative Allow the Government Access to Your DNA? The 
Fourth Amendment Implications of Law Enforcement’s Genealogical Search for the Golden State Killer and 
Other Genetic Genealogy Investigations, 10 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 103, 121–28 (2019) (Carpenter applies 
to FGGS) with Antony Barone Kolenc, “23 and Plea”: Limiting Police Use of Genealogy Sites After Carpenter 
v. United States, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 100–01 (2019) (Carpenter does not apply to FGGS, but FGGS should 
be restricted by other means), and Alexandra Nieto, Familial Searching: How Implementing Minimum 
Safeguards Ensures Constitutionally-Permissible Use of This Powerful Investigative Tool, 40 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1765 (arguing in favor of familial searching, but only briefly mentioning civilian databases and Carpenter). 
 7. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 97. 
 8. Id. at 73–74. 
 9. See, e.g., Ancestry + Traits Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dna-ancestry (last visited 
July 31, 2021). 
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thereby intrudes into their private affairs.10 The rationale of Carpenter, thus, 
does not seem to extend to FGGS. 
Likewise, FGGS is distinguishable from a public policy standpoint. The 
benefits of its use are enormous, and its nature is such that certain simple 
safeguards will minimize the likelihood of abuse. For the foregoing reasons, this 
Note expounds on a position contrary to that of the prevailing literature: that 
FGGS is not a Fourth Amendment search subject to the warrant requirement, 
and public policy supports its status as such. 
Part I of this Note reviews the process of FGGS and the ways in which it 
is currently regulated. Specifically, Part I reviews the facts and holdings of 
Carpenter and the relevant aspects of Maryland v. King, the most recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case about DNA identification. Part II applies the rationale of 
Carpenter and King to the practice and procedure of FGGS, and concludes that 
FGGS, for Fourth Amendment purposes, does not constitute a search. It also 
argues that public policy considerations favor the continued use of FGGS. Part 
III speculates how FGGS may be performed in the future and offers 
recommendations to encourage and expand the safe and effective use of FGGS. 
I. BACKGROUND 
DNA is a molecule that determines biological traits, found in the cells of 
all living things.11 Each person has a different pattern of DNA.12 Because of this 
uniqueness, DNA can be used in forensics in much the same way as fingerprints, 
and indeed with an even higher rate of success.13 DNA has been so used since 
the late 1980s.14 
Civilian DNA databases can be divided into two groups: commercial and 
open.15 The two largest commercial DNA databases, Ancestry and 23andMe, 
have (to date) 20 million and 12 million customers, respectively.16 These sites, 
and other “direct-to-customer” databases, work in much the same way. The 
customer purchases a DNA collection kit and sends the company a DNA sample, 
typically saliva.17 The company then analyzes the customer’s DNA and gives 
 
 10. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 11. LEARN.GENETICS, What are DNA and Genes?, https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/basics/dna. For 
more basic scientific background on DNA, see generally LEARN.GENETICS, Basic Genetics, 
https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/basics. 
 12. LEARN.GENETICS, supra note 11. 
 13. E.g., John K. Roman, Shannon Reid, Jay Reid, Aaron Chalfin, William Adams & Carly Knight, The 
DNA Field Experiment: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the Use of DNA in the Investigation of High-Volume 
Crimes, URBAN INST. 3 (June 16, 2008), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/dna-field-
experiment/view/full_report. 
 14. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (ruling on admissibility of 
DNA evidence), abrogated by Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997). 
 15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 3. 
 16. ANCESTRY, supra note 3. 
 17. See, e.g., How it Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/. 
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the customer information based on that analysis, including ethnic background, 
genetic relations to other users of the service, and genetic traits.18 These include 
phenotypic traits, such as eye and hair color, as well as genotypic traits, such as 
disease propensities.19 
Open DNA databases, by contrast, do not perform their own DNA testing, 
but allow users to upload their data from different commercial databases.20 The 
most prominent open database is GEDmatch, with over 1.4 million users at last 
report.21 
FGGS is a process by which law enforcement makes use of these civilian 
databases. This Note begins by detailing the current state of FGGS, then moves 
to relevant case law, focusing on Carpenter and King. 
A.  THE CURRENT PRACTICAL AND LEGAL STATE OF FGGS 
This Subpart begins by explaining the FGGS process and the fruits of its 
use. It then moves on to discuss the current restrictions on FGGS. 
1.  FGGS Procedure 
FGGS is performed as follows: first, the government contracts with a 
vender laboratory to perform the same kind of DNA analysis that a commercial 
database would perform.22 Then, the government uploads the resulting profile 
into one of the civilian sites.23 Finally, the government uses “traditional 
investigative . . . methods” to follow up on any familial matches they discover.24 
This process is known more generally as “familial searching”; FGGS refers 
specifically to familial searching using civilian databases.25 
State governments have conducted familial searches without using civilian 
databases since the early 2000s.26 This has been possible because the FBI has 
maintained a DNA database in collaboration with state governments nationwide 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. 23ANDME, supra note 9. 
 20. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 66. 
 21. GEDMATCH, gedmatch.com (last visited July 31, 2021); Peter Aldhous, A Security Breach Exposed 
More Than One Million DNA Profiles on A Major Genealogy Database, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 22, 2020, 3:01 
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/hackers-gedmatch-dna-privacy. 
 22. DEP’T OF JUST., Department of Justice Announces Interim Policy on Emerging Method to Generate 
Leads for Unsolved Violent Crimes (2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-
interim-policy-emerging-method-generate-leads-unsolved-violent (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Combined DNA Index System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (CODIS), 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 26. See Richard Willing, Suspects Get Snared by a Relative’s DNA, USA TODAY (June 7, 2005), 
Https://Usatoday30.Usatoday.Com/News/Nation/2005-06-07-Dna-Cover_X.Htm (describing a familial search 
in North Carolina in 2003). 
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called the Combined DNA Index System, or CODIS.27 But the use of civilian 
databases has two important functional differences from the use of CODIS. First, 
civilian databases use a more advanced type of DNA analysis and contain more 
detailed DNA profiles than CODIS, making familial searches easier.28 Second, 
civilian databases provide a larger and more diverse corpus of DNA profiles.29 
The well-publicized Golden State Killer case serves as an example of 
FGGS in practice and its associated benefits. The Golden State Killer’s homicide 
spree lasted from 1974 to 1986.30 During that time, he roamed California, 
committing approximately forty to fifty rapes and a dozen murders.31 For 
decades, the case was cold and the killer remained at large.32 Then, in 2018, 
investigators uploaded his DNA profile to GEDmatch.33 They discovered ten to 
twenty distant relatives of the killer, approximately third cousins.34 Using those 
matches, the investigators were able to find their common ancestor with the 
killer and trace the lineage back to the present day.35 They found two possible 
candidates, one of whom, Joseph DeAngelo, was confirmed as the killer by a 
fresh DNA sample.36 
Besides the Golden State Killer, other high-profile cold cases solved by 
FGGS include the identification and capture of John D. Miller, who committed 
an infamous rape and murder in 1988,37 and William Earl Talbott II, who 
committed a double murder in 1987.38 The crimes FGGS has solved go as far 
back as the 1970s.39 FGGS has been used to solve recent cases as well. In July 
 
 27. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited July. 
31, 2021). The following states currently perform familial searching using CODIS: Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. By contrast, the federal 
government does not. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 25. 
 28. Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1378–79 (2019). 
 29. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 66. Although CODIS contains over 19 million DNA profiles, it is limited to 
the profiles of convicts or arrestees, and thus represents only a fraction of the U.S. population. CODIS-NDIS 
Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ 
ndis-statistics. 
 30. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His Great-Great-
Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018, 3:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-
find-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/2018/04/ 
30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html. 
 31. Benjy Egel, Here’s the String of Crimes Tied to the East Area Rapist in Years of California Terror, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article209788654.html. 
 32. Jouvenal, supra note 30. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. How a Genealogist Helped Police Crack an Infamous 30-year-old Cold Case, CBS NEWS (July 17, 
2018, 7:35 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/april-tinsley-murder-police-crack-cold-case-with-cutting-
edge-genealogy. 
 38. Gearty, supra note 4. 
 39. Id. 
August 2021] FAMILIAL SEARCHES OF CIVILIAN DNA DATABASES  1723 
 
2018, a man was arrested in Utah after FGGS pinned him as the perpetrator of a 
rape he committed a few months prior.40 
In most of the recent high-profile FGGS cases, investigators conducted 
their familial search through GEDmatch rather than through a commercial 
database.41 GEDmatch offers tools that 23andMe and Ancestry do not, including 
the ability to match based on only one particular segment of DNA.42 Also, since 
GEDmatch contains DNA profiles from both Ancestry and 23andMe, as well as 
other commercial databases, it can find matches from across their respective user 
bases.43 These qualities, along with GEDmatch’s relatively more FGGS-friendly 
policy,44 are probably why law enforcement prefers to use GEDmatch over 
23andMe or Ancestry, despite GEDmatch’s comparatively smaller database. 
2.  Current Restrictions on FGGS 
The practice of FGGS, despite its novelty, is already restricted in several 
ways. For the federal government, FGGS is restricted by the Department of 
Justice’s interim policy.45 On the state side, an increasing number of states have 
enacted their own restrictions on familial searching, including outright bans.46 
Additionally, for both state and federal actors, FGGS is restricted by the privacy 
policies of civilian databases. 47 
On September 2, 2019, the Department of Justice approved an interim 
policy on FGGS that went into effect on November 11 of the same year.48 The 
policy restricts the use of FGGS to three scenarios. First, it may be used if the 
government possesses a forensic DNA sample from the putative perpetrator of 
an unsolved violent crime.49 Second, it may be used if the case involves the 
unidentified remains of a suspected homicide victim.50 Third, it may be 
authorized by the prosecutor when there is a “substantial and ongoing threat to 
public safety or national security.”51 
 
 40. Antonio Regalado, Genetic Genealogy is Now Solving Recent Crimes, Not Just Cold Cases, MIT TECH. 
REV. (July 30, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/611748/genetic-genealogy-is-now-solving-recent-
crimes-not-just-cold-cases. 
 41. Gearty, supra note 4; see also Sarah Zhang, how a Genealogy Website Led to the Alleged Golden 
State Killer, ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2018, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/04/golden-state-killer-east-area-rapist-dna-
genealogy/559070/ (investigators uploaded the Golden State Killer’s DNA to Ancestry at one point during 
their search, but no useful lead was found). 
 42. Zhang, supra note 41. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 45. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 1. 
 46. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 25. 
 47. See infra p. 1725. 
 48. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 5. 
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In these three scenarios, before the FBI or other agencies can use FGGS, 
they must first have failed to find a match in CODIS.52 They are also required to 
consider other “reasonable scientific alternatives.”53 Only after consulting a 
laboratory official on such alternatives and after the prosecutor and agency agree 
that FGGS is a “necessary and appropriate” step, may they proceed with the 
FGGS process.54 
The policy requires agencies to identify themselves as law enforcement to 
the civilian database and to only use databases that notify users of the possibility 
of law enforcement use in criminal investigations.55 If the government needs to 
collect the DNA of a non-suspect, it must do so with informed consent.56 
However, if a formal request were to “compromise the integrity of the 
investigation,” it may instead collect the DNA covertly so long as it obtains a 
search warrant before sending the sample to a vender laboratory.57 A suspect 
should not be arrested on the sole basis of a genetic association.58 
The policy also lays out rules for handling the DNA data itself. Such data 
must be treated as confidential government information.59 When a suspect is 
arrested after their genetic information has been sent to a third party, the 
government must request all of the suspect’s data be removed from the database 
and returned to the government.60 If no arrest occurs, or if an arrest occurs and 
after a judicial order is entered, the government may then destroy all related 
genetic records.61 Throughout the process, the suspect’s DNA data must only be 
used for identification purposes and not to learn the genetic traits of the 
suspect.62 
The FBI does not purport to regulate familial searching at the state level, 
leaving it to the states’ discretion.63 Maryland and the District of Columbia have 
enacted laws to prohibit all familial searching.64 For those states that do perform 
 
 52. Id. (the term “reasonable scientific alternatives” is not defined in the document). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 5–6. 
 55. Id. at 6. (all of the notable civilian databases currently include such a notification in their terms of 
service); see also Terms and Conditions (US), ANCESTRY (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/ 
health-terms (last visited July 31, 2021); Terms of Service, 23ANDME (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.23andme.com/about/tos (last visited July 31, 2021); Terms and Service and Privacy Policy, 
GEDMATCH (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.gedmatch.com/terms-of-service-privacy-policy (last visited July 31, 
2021). 
 56. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 6. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 7. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 8. 
 62. Id. at 4, 6–7. 
 63. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 25. 
 64. Id.; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (West 2009) (prohibiting all “person[s]” from 
conducting familial searching); D.C. CODE § 22-4151(b) (2009) (prohibiting familial searching using DNA 
collected by a state agency). 
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familial searching, their regulations vary.65 Nonetheless, there are common 
elements among the various statutes; for example, they all have restrictions on 
what kinds of crimes can be investigated using familial searching.66 
The two largest commercial databases, Ancestry and 23andMe, both 
oppose FGGS. Ancestry’s privacy statement declares, “Ancestry does not 
voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement.”67 Ancestry’s Terms and 
Conditions (US) require that any DNA submitted must be either the user’s own 
DNA or the DNA of someone for whom the user is a legal guardian, without 
exception.68 23andMe’s Terms of Service likewise require that the user submit 
only their own DNA or that of a dependent.69 
Despite these assurances, it may be that commercial databases are less 
resistant to law enforcement activity than their policies would suggest.70 For 
example, in 2019 the company FamilyTreeDNA was revealed to have been 
voluntarily disclosing its users’ information to the FBI, despite its stated policy 
that it would not do so.71 Moreover, provisions against uploading another 
person’s DNA may be toothless because commercial databases have no means 
of actually preventing such a practice.72 
GEDmatch’s policy markedly differs from those of the large commercial 
databases. Unlike 23andMe and Ancestry, GEDmatch allows for the uploading 
of another person’s data by law enforcement in cases of murder, nonnegligent 
manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or aggravated assault, or to identify a 
dead body.73 Elsewhere in its policy, GEDmatch stresses a second time that a 
user’s data may be used in familial searching by law enforcement.74 To be sure, 
a user must “opt in” to have their data be viewable by users who identify 
themselves as law enforcement.75 However, GEDmatch has previously allowed 
Florida law enforcement, under warrant, to conduct FGGS using its entire 
database.76 
 
 65. See Nieto, supra note 6, at 1772. 
 66. See id. at 1776–77. 
 67. Your Privacy, ANCESTRY (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last 
visited July 31, 2021). 
 68. ANCESTRY, supra note 55. 
 69. 23ANDME, supra note 55. 
 70. Katelyn N. Ringrose, Note, A Cautionary Note: Genealogy Companies Need to Stop Giving 
Warrantless DNA Clues to Law Enforcement, 124 PENN. STATIM 302, 325 (2019). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 324–25. 
 73. GEDMATCH, supra note 55. 
 74. Id. (“For example, some of these possible uses of [data] . . . include but are not limited to . . . familial 
searching by third parties . . ..”). 
 75. Id. Only around 260,000 of GEDmatch’s 1.45 million users have opted in. Alex Wood, DNA, 
Genealogy Lead to Arrest in Series of Rapes, J. INQUIRER (June 10, 2020), https://www.journalinquirer.com/ 
crime_and_courts/dna-genealogy-led-to-arrest-in-series-of-rapes/article_27b25296-ab2d-11ea-8b3e-
472861ca42e0.html. 
 76. Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida Judge Just Said Otherwise, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-search-warrant.html. 
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B.  CARPENTER AND OTHER CASE LAW 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees against 
“unreasonable” searches.77 Courts have generally interpreted “reasonable” to 
require a warrant,78 and “search” as an act of the government that infringes either 
a property right or a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”79 In 
delineating the scope of a “reasonable expectation,” courts have developed the 
third-party doctrine, which states that persons have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information they disclose to a third party.80 This doctrine was recently 
narrowed by Carpenter v. United States.81 
1.  Carpenter v. United States: Limiting the Third-Party Doctrine 
Carpenter’s technical background is somewhat complex. In short, every 
cellular phone connects to a cellular network several times a minute.82 Each time 
the phone connects, the cellular service provider records the approximate 
location of the device at the moment of connection.83 The geo-location accuracy 
(at the time of the facts of Carpenter) ranged from an eighth of a square mile to 
four square miles.84 The provider stores all of these location data, which are 
referred to as cell site location information (CSLI).85 As a consequence, cellular 
service providers possess information on the location of every cell phone user, 
whenever they had their cell phone on their person, for as far back as they retain 
the records (up to five years at the time of the decision).86 In Carpenter, police 
obtained a court order—but not a warrant—to acquire the defendant’s CSLI that 
the provider had acquired over a period of 127 days.87 These data were used as 
evidence to link the defendant to a series of robberies.88 
The Court began by noting that the case lay at the “intersection” of two 
separate lines of precedent.89 The first line of precedent (although less a line than 
a single case) consisted of the agreement of a five-justice majority in United 
States v. Jones that long-term GPS monitoring of a suspect’s location by the 
 
While the proper scope of an FGGS warrant is a difficult question itself, this Note confines itself to the question 
of whether FGGS can be performed without a warrant. 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 78. E.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019). 
 79. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012). 
 80. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
 81. Id. at 2217. 
 82. Id. at 2211. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2218. 
 85. Id. at 2211–12. 
 86. Id. at 2218. 
 87. Id. at 2212. The order was issued under a “reasonable grounds” standard, less exacting than the 
“probable cause” standard required for a warrant. Id. 
 88. Id. at 2212–13. 
 89. Id. at 2214–15. 
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government constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.90 The second 
line of precedent was the third-party doctrine, developed in cases such as Smith 
v. Maryland and United States v. Miller.91 Miller applied this doctrine to a 
person’s bank records, which are retained by the bank, and Smith to the numbers 
a person dials on their home phone, which are recorded by the telephone 
company.92 Because the defendant’s CSLI was long-term location information 
like in Jones, but also automatically disclosed to a third party like the dialed 
numbers in Smith, existing precedent was contradictory as to whether CSLI was 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.93 A clarifying decision was needed. 
The Court settled this conflict by holding that Jones trumped the third-party 
doctrine.94 First, the Court observed that CSLI fell neatly under Jones because 
it “provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts,” revealing 
“movements . . . and . . . associations” and “privacies of life.”95 In fact, CSLI 
could be––and was––used to track a person more exhaustively than a GPS 
device attached to a car could.96 “A cell phone faithfully follows its owner 
beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, 
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”97 The Court also 
noted that CSLI was continuing to grow more accurate and that the decision 
must take account of the cutting edge of technological improvements.98 
The Court then turned to the third-party doctrine, noting the doctrine was 
never meant to automatically and unconditionally apply whenever a defendant 
has shared information with a third party.99 It observed the information that the 
government had collected in Smith and Miller was somewhat limited: telephone 
numbers, and “negotiable instruments,” respectively.100 The Court reasoned that 
“[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of personal 
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of 
location information casually collected by wireless carriers today.”101 The 
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 98. Id. at 2218–19. 
 99. Id. at 2219. 
 100. Id. at 2216. 
 101. Id. at 2219. 
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government’s position, therefore, would not be a “straightforward application” 
of the third-party doctrine but a “significant extension” of it.102 
The Court also noted that cell phone location information “is not truly 
‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”103 Cell phones and the services 
they provide are “‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying 
one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”104 “[A] cell phone logs 
a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part 
of the user beyond powering up.”105 
The Court stressed that its decision was narrow, did not “disturb the 
application of Smith and Miller,” and did not even extend to other possible kinds 
of CSLI, let alone other technologies.106 It then confirmed that there was no 
applicable exception to the warrant requirement.107 
2.  Maryland v. King: When is DNA Unproblematic? 
Before this Note turns to Carpenter’s application to FGGS, it is worthwhile 
to examine another potentially relevant case. The Supreme Court’s most recent 
case dealing with DNA and privacy is Maryland v. King.108 Although King’s 
holding does not directly bear upon the issue of FGGS, it is helpful on some 
points. 
The defendant in King was convicted of rape based on a DNA match.109 
When he was arrested for an unrelated crime, officers collected his DNA by 
swabbing the inside of his cheek.110 When they checked the DNA against 
CODIS, they discovered a match with the earlier rape.111 The defendant was 
subsequently charged and found guilty of the rape, and later challenged the 
constitutionality of the swab.112 The Maryland state statute authorizing the swab 
only allowed swabs of persons in custody for a serious offense supported by 
probable cause.113 
The Court held that since the swab involved an unwanted trespass on the 
defendant’s person, the Fourth Amendment applied.114 The Court then weighed 
the government’s interests in performing the swabs against the privacy interest 
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implicated.115 The swabs served the important governmental purpose of 
identifying the arrested person and formed part of the booking process.116 In this 
respect, they were no different from the use of mugshots or fingerprinting.117 
The Court also noted the importance of DNA identification in absolving 
innocent suspects.118 
The Court then reviewed the history of using new developments in forensic 
science to identify suspects and reasoned that DNA was one more step 
forward.119 DNA was an even better form of identification than the last great 
forensic innovation—fingerprinting—because while facial features and even 
fingerprints can be changed, DNA typically cannot.120 
Turning to the privacy interests, the Court held that the minimal intrusion 
of a cheek swab did not outweigh the immense value of DNA identification.121 
Moving on to the separate issue of the CODIS processing, the Court held that it 
was not unconstitutional for three reasons.122 First, CODIS uses sections of DNA 
that do not reveal the genetic traits of the person from whom the DNA 
originates.123 Second, the DNA in CODIS is analyzed only to generate a unique 
identity, not to determine genetic traits.124 Third, the authorizing statute 
contained provisions against using DNA for any purpose other than 
identification.125 
Ultimately, Maryland v. King is too narrow to be helpful in illuminating 
the question here.126 This is because, unlike CODIS, the DNA samples used in 
civilian databases can be used to determine genetic traits.127 While the opinion 
does mention that the statute at issue forbade familial searching, it does so only 
in passing.128 The main point to take from King is that “a statutory or regulatory 
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures’ generally allays . . . privacy 
concerns.”129 
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II.  THE APPLICATION OF CARPENTER TO FGGS 
Strictly speaking, Carpenter has no effect on FGGS one way or another 
because Carpenter was a narrow holding about cell site data,130 and DNA is not 
cell site data.131 But the broader rationale underlying the specific details of 
Carpenter—namely, that the third-party doctrine is limited by certain 
considerations—raises questions. Several commentators have considered the 
possible application of Carpenter’s rationale to FGGS, and they have routinely, 
if not uniformly, suggested that it should indeed apply.132 But a closer reading 
of Carpenter reveals that DNA is not so easily analogized. 
A.  DISTINGUISHING CARPENTER DOCTRINALLY 
The DNA involved in a familial search is distinguishable from CSLI in two 
important ways. First, users of civilian databases willingly and deliberately share 
their DNA, and second, DNA does not reveal a person’s actions. Moreover, law 
enforcement does not access users’ DNA information directly when it conducts 
FGGS.133 
1.  Users Voluntarily Share Their DNA With Civilian Databases 
Since its inception, the third-party doctrine has required that the individual 
have voluntarily disclosed the disputed information to the third party.134 In 
Carpenter, the Court noted that CSLI was not really “shared” for the purposes 
of the third-party doctrine for two reasons: first, because cell phones are 
indispensable devices in modern society; second, because a phone discloses 
CSLI “by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the 
user.”135 
Two recent cases have expounded upon each of these prongs. In United 
States v. Hood, the defendant challenged the government’s warrantless 
acquisition of his IP address data, arguing that Carpenter applied.136 The First 
Circuit disagreed, noting that the defendant had generated the data “only by 
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making the affirmative decision to access a website or application. By 
contrast . . . every time a cell phone receives a call, text message, or email, the 
cell phone pings CSLI to the nearest cell site tower without the cell phone user 
lifting a finger.”137 
In Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, the defendant 
city had used “smart meters” to collect detailed energy consumption data from 
citizens’ houses.138 The plaintiffs challenged this practice as a violation of their 
Fourth Amendment rights.139 On appeal, the defendant argued that the third-
party doctrine permitted it to collect the data.140 The Seventh Circuit applied 
Carpenter, observing that the citizens effectively had no choice but to purchase 
electricity from the city, just as people have little choice but to use cell phones.141 
FGGS is distinguishable from CSLI on both prongs of this analysis. First, 
consider indispensability. Genetic testing is a discretionary service, not an 
essential one. It serves the functions of identifying predisposition to certain 
diseases, locating a person’s relatives, and allowing a person to learn their 
genetic ancestry.142 The last of these serves little more than curiosity. The others 
are undoubtedly useful, but they are very far from being as “indispensable to 
participation in modern society” as cell phones are.143 Admittedly, technology 
ever advances, and it is at least possible that genetic testing will one day be as 
ubiquitous as cell phone usage. But that is by no means certain and does not 
affect the analysis of today.144 
Second, the disclosure of genetic information to a genetic testing company 
is undoubtedly an “affirmative act.” In Miller, the third-party doctrine applied 
to information that was merely disclosed “in the ordinary course of business.”145 
But for civilian databases, genetic information is the business. The very premise 
of a commercial database is that the customer will disclose their genetic 
information to the company, which will then be analyzed and presented to the 
customer.146 To disclose their genetic information, the customer must purchase 
a testing kit, deposit saliva into a tube, and mail the tube to the company’s 
laboratory.147 One could hardly imagine a more deliberate disclosure. In this 
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respect, civilian DNA databases fit into the third-party doctrine more neatly than 
even the doctrine’s foundational cases. 
The Court in Carpenter declined to overrule Smith and Miller, 148 even 
though those cases each involved an indispensable aspect of modern life––home 
telephone usage and banking, respectively––and each also involved a disclosure 
that was only incidental to doing business. 149 Since FGGS involves a non-
essential service and a deliberate, affirmative disclosure central to a transaction, 
it deals with data that were shared more definitively than in Smith and Miller. 
Carpenter, then, cannot restrict FGGS on the ground that it accesses data that 
were not “shared.” If the Carpenter rationale were to have any bearing on the 
status of FGGS, it would be on account of the nature of the data. 
2.  The Nature of DNA Compared with Location Information 
In deciding Carpenter, the Court repeatedly emphasized the power of 
location information to divulge many intimate details of a person’s life.150 It 
commented that the Court in Smith did not foresee the “novel circumstances” of 
such a “detailed and comprehensive record of [a] person’s movements.”151 
Applying the third-party doctrine would go against “society’s 
expectation . . . [that] law enforcement agents and others would not—and 
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every 
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”152 The privacy 
interest violated was that “in the whole of [one’s] physical movements.”153 
Following Carpenter, the Circuit courts have recognized location 
information as deserving of special treatment. In United States v. Hood, the First 
Circuit held that Carpenter did not apply to IP address information because that 
information was not location information.154 In United States v. Beverly, the 
government collected various non-CSLI data related to the defendant’s phone.155 
The defendant argued that the data should be suppressed under Carpenter 
because they might be used to track his location.156 The Fifth Circuit rejected 
this argument because the defendant had no basis for his claim that the data could 
be so used.157 “With no showing of that,” said the court, “[the defendant]’s 
attempt to force this evidence into Carpenter’s holding is a nonstarter.”158 
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This granting of a special status to location information fits into a broader 
Fourth Amendment trend of protecting information that tends to reveal the 
pattern of a person’s day-to-day actions. In Riley v. California, the data stored 
on a cell phone were held to be protected in part because they could “form a 
revealing montage of the user’s life.”159 Both Riley and Carpenter quote the 
same line from Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones: location data can 
reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”160 Thus, data that reveals “associations” seems to be afforded 
special protection. 
Some commentators have suggested that DNA can “map” a person’s 
behavior just as CSLI can, indicating that courts should apply the Carpenter 
rationale.161 It may be true that DNA can reveal a disposition more inclined 
towards particular behavior, but an inclination towards an action is not an action. 
DNA cannot reveal anything about a person’s actual actions, conduct, or 
character. 
Exactly what sorts of information does DNA reveal, then? 23andMe 
advertises that its DNA analysis can reveal some physical traits such as eye and 
hair color, the shape of some facial features, medical predispositions, and 
sensitivity to certain tastes.162 And, of course, it can reveal the genetic 
relationships between people.163 Let us examine these types of personal 
information one at a time. 
First, there is information about a person’s facial features. As personal 
information goes, one’s facial features are as far from private as one might 
imagine. True, there are growing political and legal concerns about the privacy 
implications raised by ever-improving facial recognition technology.164 But 
DNA facial reconstruction is inherently limited because facial structure is 
affected by factors other than DNA, such as hormonal variation, epigenetics, and 
cosmetic alteration.165 
Then there is information about a person’s propensity for certain diseases. 
This is, in most circumstances, the most private and intimate of the details that 
may be revealed by DNA testing. Yet even this information does not actually 
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reveal anything about the course of a person’s life; a predisposition for a disease 
is not a guarantee. 
Finally, there is information about a person’s genetic relatives. This is not 
the same thing as information about “familial associations.” People regularly 
have important familial relations with no direct genetic relationship, such as 
spouses, in-laws, step-relatives, and adoptive families.166 Conversely, everyone 
has many genetic relatives whom they have never even met. Indeed, one of the 
main purposes of the commercial DNA services is to allow people to learn about 
those genetic relatives with whom they currently have no familial 
associations.167 
Possible future improvements to DNA analysis should also be considered 
under a Carpenter analysis. Part of Carpenter’s rationale was that CSLI 
technology could only continue to improve in accuracy, making its use even 
more invasive into a person’s privacy.168 But no matter how much further DNA 
analysis progresses in the future, no matter how detailed it becomes, the 
substance of it will not change. Perhaps the list of physical traits identifiable 
from DNA will grow longer; perhaps the ability to find a person’s relatives will 
increase in range of degrees of removal; perhaps more susceptibilities to disease 
will be pinpointed. But no new discovery can change the substantive differences 
between genetic information and location information. Even if the day comes 
when we can read a person’s DNA as clearly as a book, there will be no chapter 
in that book detailing any action or event beyond the moment of that person’s 
birth. 
3.  Could the Foregoing Analysis be Moot? 
The entire privacy analysis in the context of FGGS could be moot for two 
reasons. The first reason has to do with the premise of an expectation of privacy. 
Thus far, this Note has discussed a person’s privacy interest (or lack thereof) in 
their own uploaded DNA. But when a familial search is conducted, the proper 
question may not be “what expectation of privacy is there in your DNA?” but 
rather “what expectation of privacy is there in a genetic relative’s DNA?”169 The 
answer is probably that there is none, because there is probably no societal 
expectation of privacy in another person’s body.170 In fact, a would-be plaintiff 
may not even have standing to make the argument, for want of a legally 
cognizable injury.171 
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The second reason has to do with the premise that genetic information will 
be revealed to the government by FGGS. Thus far, this Note has discussed DNA 
privacy as if FGGS necessitated examining the whole of a person’s genetic data 
and all the personal implications thereof. But in fact, FGGS does not involve 
examining every detail of a person’s DNA—it only requires a determination of 
whether and to what extent it matches other sets of DNA.172 Indeed, the DOJ’s 
policy dictates that “personal genetic information [shall not be] transferred, 
retrieved, downloaded, or retained by [civilian database] users—including law 
enforcement—during the automated search and comparison process.”173 It also 
states that “[i]nvestigative agencies shall use biological samples and [FGGS] 
profiles only for law enforcement identification purposes . . . . Biological 
samples and FGGS profiles shall not be used by investigative agencies, vendor 
laboratories, [civilian databases], or others to determine the sample donor’s 
genetic predisposition for disease or any other medical condition or 
psychological trait.”174 
In King, the Supreme Court reiterated its longstanding doctrine that “a 
‘statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures’ generally 
allays . . . privacy concerns.”175 So long as a policy like the DOJ’s is in place, 
the complex DNA data used in FGGS is no more of a tattle-tale than is the non-
coding DNA in King. It has become a characterless identifier, like a fingerprint 
or an identification number. 
B.  DISTINGUISHING CARPENTER POLITICALLY 
Having completed a survey of the doctrinal issues, the next step is to 
examine the practical implications to assess whether FGGS ought to be 
doctrinally unrestrained. 
With the present surge in the online promulgation of DNA data, there are 
serious concerns that a lack of privacy safeguards may lead to a rise in genetic 
discrimination.176 True, there is the DOJ’s policy against using DNA data for 
any purpose but identification, coupled with the principle (invoked in King) that 
a formal duty to avoid disclosure may be sufficient.177 However, while such 
safeguards may satisfy on a formalistic level, they may not prove to be so 
satisfying on a practical level. After all, our nation’s history is replete with 
examples of discrimination in the face of de jure guarantees against 
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discrimination.178 However, the risk of genetic discrimination resulting from 
FGGS seems to be low, if only because extrapolating medical details is not 
necessary to conduct FGGS. Additionally, the fact that investigators have thus 
far used GEDmatch, instead of databases with larger user bases and FGGS 
prohibitions, suggests that they are willing to respect the policies of civilian 
databases. To object to genetic databases because they might conceivably lead 
to genetic discrimination, could be compared to objecting to mugshots because 
they might lead to discrimination on the basis of color. 
What is more, the use of FGGS may have an anti-discriminatory effect 
when it comes to race. African Americans are overrepresented in CODIS.179 The 
highest-profile murderer brought to light by a familial search of CODIS, Lonnie 
Franklin, Jr., is black.180 By contrast, people of Northern European ancestry are 
more heavily represented in civilian databases.181 Of the murderers brought to 
justice in the recent wave of FGGS-based arrests, most were white.182 Thus, 
FGGS may serve to ameliorate the disparate racial impact which would result 
from the exclusive use of CODIS.183 
Some commentators, while conceding that FGGS is not restricted by the 
Fourth Amendment, have called for statutory or executive regulation of FGGS 
to prevent abuses that might result from a complete absence of standards.184 
Since those articles were written, the DOJ has issued its policy, fulfilling that 
regulatory role at the federal level and setting an example for states to follow. 
Other writers have raised the possibility of false positives, noting that the 
Golden State Killer investigators had to approach several DNA-matching 
suspects before they found the culprit.185 But those same investigators were able 
to clear the innocent men and confirm the only guilty one by collecting new 
DNA samples.186 It is an inevitable part of criminal investigation, so long as its 
methods are imperfect and its conductors not omniscient, that innocent citizens 
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will sometimes fall under suspicion. If anything, DNA analysis, because of its 
accuracy, is the method least likely to place an innocent person under suspicion. 
An example of DNA’s favored status may be gleaned from a comparison 
of Riley and King. Both cases involved a search conducted on a person who had 
just been arrested, with the accompanying decrease in expectations of privacy.187 
In each case, the Court nevertheless held that a privacy interest was 
implicated.188 But in Riley, the Court held that the cell phone data were not 
valuable enough to justify the intrusion, while in King, the defendant’s DNA and 
its ability to act as an identifier was of great enough value to outweigh the 
intrusion.189 
In King, the Supreme Court lauded the unparalleled power of DNA 
databases to reveal the guilty and spare the innocent.190 Yet King dealt only with 
government-database, non-familial searching.191 In the years since King, FGGS 
has made strides which make the method used in King seem insignificant by 
comparison. It has solved one of the most notorious serial murder cases in the 
nation’s history.192 It has pinpointed the culprits of crimes as old as thirty years 
before, and as recently as two months before.193 The latter cases, in particular, 
inspire hope that victims in the future may not have to wait long for justice to be 
done, as previous generations have. 
III.  MOVING FORWARD: PREDICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
What lies ahead for FGGS? The commercial databases will probably 
continue to update their privacy policies, trying to strike a balance between 
assuaging their customers’ fears and maximizing the extent to which they can 
profit from their customers’ data. Perhaps they will keep to their present privacy 
pledges, and perhaps not. Either way, it will be of little importance for FGGS, 
because most or all FGGS will not be conducted through them but through 
GEDmatch due to that site’s significant advantages. 
The final version of the DOJ’s policy was originally planned to be issued 
sometime in 2020.194 At the time of this Note’s publication, the final policy has 
not been released or a new date set. What changes will the final version make, 
and how will it be implemented in practice? Such speculation lies beyond this 
Note, but to the extent that the policy’s provisions do not significantly deviate 
from those of the interim version, they will probably satisfy the requirements of 
Fourth Amendment law and the associated practical concerns. 
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Putting official policy aside, it is unlikely FGGS will be used to investigate 
any crimes other than serious violent crimes. The time, effort, and resources 
FGGS can require seem to preclude such a broadened use.195 The policies of the 
DOJ and GEDmatch both restrict the use of FGGS to violent crimes and a few 
other exigencies.196 This comports with popular opinion: at least one study 
suggests that the public is much more open to the use of FGGS in violent crime 
cases.197 
Concerns about genetic privacy and discrimination should not be 
discounted. As technology advances, the law sometimes struggles to keep up, 
and genetics is no exception. For example, there are gaps in the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act regarding discrimination on the basis of 
genetics that need to be statutorily addressed.198 However, that is outside the 
responsibility of those who perform FGGS. Their part is to ensure they do not 
collect information on the more sensitive details revealed by DNA, and merely 
identify the similarities between DNA profiles. 
Considering the potential value of FGGS, states that have banned familial 
searching should consider lifting their bans. States that do not currently practice 
familial searching should consider doing so. States that practice familial 
searching should ensure they have sensible regulations to satisfy Maryland v. 
King. 
All three groups can look to the Department of Justice’s policy as an 
example. In particular, there are two provisions within that policy that assuage 
popular concerns without compromising the effectiveness of FGGS. First, the 
policy’s restriction of FGGS to violent crimes (and other exigencies) brings it in 
line with public opinion.199 Second, its prohibition of using a suspect’s DNA to 
learn their genetic traits is a way of averting the problem of genetic 
discrimination. 
Although public opinion of FGGS seems to be cautiously optimistic, more 
could be done to educate the public on the differences between familial 
searching and the traditional government subpoena of data.200 The increasing 
amount of governmental data surveillance is a growing concern among 
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Americans.201 But familial searching does not implicate the same concerns. 
Since it involves posing as a user, the government cannot uncover any 
information about a person that they have not already made available to other 
users. The point should also be emphasized that FGGS is no more a risk to 
privacy than CODIS familial searching.202 
On the civilian side, commercial databases like 23andMe and Ancestry 
should consider revising their privacy policies, because familial searching does 
not threaten the privacy of those sites’ users any more than other users do.203 An 
opt-in provision, like the one used by GEDmatch, would allow these databases 
to contribute to FGGS while still respecting the wishes of their users. 23andMe, 
it should be noted, already encourages its users to volunteer their DNA data for 
scientific research.204 A similar volunteer system for law enforcement purposes 
should not seem out of the question. Finally, the author would encourage his 
readers who have used 23andMe or another commercial service to consider 
uploading their data to an open database such as GEDmatch. Increasing the size 
and scope of such a database serves the public interest without disclosing any 
more information than you already have. 
CONCLUSION 
FGGS is a powerful new forensic tool that has already, in its brief 
existence, put many infamous criminals behind bars. It is not a “search” subject 
to the usual warrant requirement under the Carpenter decision because DNA 
information, unlike location information, cannot reveal anything about a 
person’s actions or the circumstances of their life. Furthermore, there exist 
regulatory duties to safeguard any personal information DNA could reveal. 
Because of FGGS’s extreme usefulness to society and its relative lack of privacy 
implications, its use should be encouraged in law and policy. 
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